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POINT

A SELF-EVALUATION

PRIVILEGE WILL

ENHANCE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE IN MISSOURI
by Bradley S. Hiles'
During the 199 0's, one of the
most striking and beneficial developments
in the environmental realm has been the
use of environmental self-evoluations
(sometimes referred to as compliance
audits) by the regulated community.
Faced with literally volumes of state and
federal environmental regulations, many
companies have created staff positions
and even departments of experts to
evaluate environmental compliance.
Other companies, small businesses in
particular, retain outside experts to audit
their facilities. In many cases, these
audits are performed without advance
notice to facility personnel. Often, where
non-compliance
is found,
these
companies implement voluntary corrective
measures.
These actions are taken
without prompting by governmental
agencies. Some companies, in fact,
have established goals of "environmental
excellence"
which
exceed
the
requirements of law.
Unfortunately,
Missouri's
environmental laws and tort laws have
the effect of discouraging broad

self-evaluations. This effect may not be
intended, but it is real. By their very
nature, environmental audits identify and
document non-compliance. This creates
a record which is potentially available to
enforcement officials and private party
plaintiffs. Missouri law fails to distinguish
between the companies trying to "do the
right thing," (e.g. committing resources to
the discovery and correction of
non-compliance) from those companies
that do not.
Missouri is not alone. In most
states, a corporate executive who
authorizes an environmental audit has
already decided to accept the risk that
the audit report may be used in an
enforcement action or toxic tort lawsuit
against his company. Here is a case in
point: On July 22, 1993 the Colorado
Department of Health fined Coors
Brewing Company $1.05 million for
alleged violations of state air pollution
laws. This fine was imposed after Coors
conducted a $1 million self-evaluation
that revealed higher-than-expected VOC
emissions at its Golden, Colorado

brewery. Prior to this self-evaluation,
Coors had relied upon a California study
which had estimated VOC emissions in
the brewing industry. Before Coors' $1
million study, other major brewers,
Colorado's Health Department, and even
EPA were not aware that breweries emit
larger amounts of VOCs than previously
estimated in the California study. Coors
was a trailblazer; the company
invalidated an emissions study previously
considered reliable by industry and the
government.
Their reward was the
largest fine ever issued by the Colorado
Department of Health.
Incidents like these chill the
desires of corporate officials to
investigate
their
companies'
environmental compliance. A study of
environmental self-evoluations performed
in 1995 by Price Waterhouse, L.L.P.
proves this concern is real. Companies
which had some variety of audit
programs were asked to identify reasons
they would not expand those programs.
Fiftyone percent of the respondents cited
fear of civil enforcement action. Other
reasons cited as "detractors" for
environmental auditing were use in a
citizen's suit (48%), toxic tort litigation
(46%), and criminal enforcement actions
(49%).' Companies were also asked to
identify factors that would encourage
more audits. The most often cited factor
(64%) was the elimination of penalties
imposed by enforcement agencies for
companies who have identified, reported
and corrected non-compliance.
The
second most often cited factor to
encourage audits was a federal privilege
law (49%). In addition, 42% of the
respondents said they would be
encouraged to conduct audits if their
state had a privilege law.4

(continued on Page 134)

1 Mr. Hiles is a partner in the St. Louis office of Peper, MartinJensen, Maichel & Hellage, where he chairs the firm's Environmental Department. In 1994, he served
as the administrator of a statewide working group of atlomeys, engineers, and industry representatives that drafted model legislation For on environmental audit
privilege law in Missouri
2 The Monsanto Company, For example, adopted "The Monsanto Pledge" in 1990, establishing such lofty goals as a 90% reduction in air emissions for 300
chemicals, worldwide.
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